We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic game when combined) -concepts like "social norms," and "mechanisms" can be easily accommodated, as well as philosophical/sociological definitions of social institutions Focusing on strategies rather than on mechanisms have two advantages: First, focusing on strategies allows us to distinguish between those aspects that are behavioral in nature and are subject to alternative design, and those that are part of the environment. Second, considering
Introduction
Economists have long recognized the importance of social institutions in economic processes. However, attempts to formalize them have been relatively recent, and seemingly confliting. In particular, social institutions have been defined as strategies in a particular repeated game by Schotter (1981, p. 155) , and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995, p. 83) , and also as families of game forms by Hurwicz (1996, p. 117) . We will use a game-theoretic approach and define a social institution as a family of strategies. We then argue that Hurwicz's formulation can be encompassed in the game-theoretic formulation we use in a natural way, and discuss the advantages of doing so.
In the game-theoretic approach of Schotter (1981) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) the first step consists of the description of the society we are interested in. A society will be described by listing all its members, all the actions that each one of the society members can take, and, finally, each member's preferences over action combinations. Hence, we naturally describe any society by a normal formal game. Further, we assume that the society will last forever, and that its members, their actions, and preferences can change through time. Thus, although a normal form game describes the society in a given point in time, its complete description is provided by a stochastic game.
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As in Hurwicz (1994, p. 6) , we view the space of outcomes as the natural space over which society members have their preferences. Therefore we add a physical outcome function , to the stochastic game describing a given society, which gives the physical outcome of any action combination, and an utility function for each member -each member's payoff function is then the composition of the physical outcome function with that member's utility function. This formalization tries to capture a situation in which players' actions, together with a given realization of the uncertainty, produce an outcome according to the laws of physics, in a way that is described by the physical outcome function.
The stochastic game and the physical outcome function describe the (eco-nomic) environment, and are considered to be given. In order to complete the description of a given society, we add the notion of strategies, which describe the behavioral aspects of society' members. A strategy is a set of rules that tell each member of the society how to act in any possible contingency. We then define a social institution as a family of strategies.
The following example tries to clarify our view. Consider a legal code in a given society. The effect of the legal code is that certain actions of certain people will be consider 'illegal,' and a certain punishment, to be enforced by a different group of people, will be associated with those actions. Thus, we associate a legal code with the set of all strategies respecting the above properties, i.e., all the strategies that will trigger the corresponding punishment whenever an illegal action is taken.
The example also shows why a social institution should be defined as a family of strategies rather than a particular strategy. If two strategies respect the defining properties of a legal code but differ on the legal actions a given player takes, then we would still say that the legal code prevails in both cases.
Our view is thus that social institutions are rules of behavior. Here is interesting to contrast our interpretation with that of North (1990, p. 3) and Schotter (1981, p. 155) . For North, "[i] nstitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." Schotter has a different opinion: "For us, however, what we call social institutions are not the rules of the game but rather the alternative equilibrium standards of behavior or conventions of behavior that evolve from a given game described by its rules. In other words, for us, institutions are properties of the equilibrium of games and not properties of the game's description."
In our opinion, both views are acceptable depending on the focus we use: from the analyst's point of view, institutions are (families of) strategies; however, from the viewpoint of the players, institutions are rules that shape their interaction.
Let us now describe Hurwicz's formulation (see Hurwicz (1994), and Hurwicz (1996) .) In Hurwicz's formulation, a social institution is a family of mechanisms (synonymously, game forms). A mechanism consists of a strategy space for each player and an outcome function, mapping strategies into outcomes. Note that Hurwicz's outcome function differs from our physical outcome function because, while our physical outcome function reflects only physical aspects, "[q]uite often a game form has two aspects: (1) those that are behavioral in nature and are (potentially at least) subject to alternative design and embody the essence of institutional arrangements, and (2) those that are considered as given, either because they are determined by the laws of physics or, more generally, by at we call the (economic) environment (in particular by the existing resource endowments, and the current state of technology)." (Hurwicz (1996, p. 118) .)
The objective of Hurwicz's outcome functions is to describe the consequences of players' choices of strategies. However, it is often enough to know how the outcome changes if only one player changes his strategy, as it is the case in equilibrium analysis. In this case, we only need, for every strategy and for every player, a mapping from that player's strategy space into the outcome space, which is a "partial" outcome function. Our point is that each strategy, together with the given physical outcome function, induces such a partial outcome function for every player, and thus, a family of strategies (i.e., a social institution) induces a family of partial outcome functions, which together with the given strategy space, define a family of mechanisms.
Hence, in our view, a game-theoretic formulation (as described above) does not conflict with the one proposed by Hurwicz. In fact, it can be viewed as an attempt to address the following two concerns expressed in Hurwicz (1996) .
First, focusing on strategies allows us to separate explicitly the aspects that are behavioral in nature from those that are determined by the laws of physics or, more generally, by the environment. In our formulation, a given strategy is responsible for the behavioral aspects and the physical outcome function is responsible for the physical aspects. Since the behavioral aspects are the ones that are subject to alternative design and embody the essence of institutional arrangements, we associate social institutions with strategies.
Second, considering strategies instead of the (partial) outcome function induced by them allows for a more detailed look into the way an outcome function "works." As Hurwicz points out (Hurwicz (1996) , page 123) "(...) the results specified by the outcome function must also be "delivered". Mechanisms such as markets or social insurance, illustrate the need for special machinery required to carry out, in addition to enforcement, the informational functions (in particular, communication) as well as the physical flow of goods and financial instruments. (...) [I] speak of "genuine implementation", with the intention of covering the complex of all activities designed to make the outcome function effective."
In other words, our approach provides a more detailed analysis of how an outcome function is genuinely implemented by analyzing the incentives of every person involved in it -including those responsible for enforcement, informational functions, and so on.
The argument above notwithstanding, there are applications where it may be more natural to work directly with outcome functions, instead of incorporating all the people that are involved in the problem, and all their possible actions. This is certainly the case when some aspects can be taken as given, or when modelling them explicitly would complicate the analysis without adding much insight. However, as we try to demonstrate in Chapter 4, our analysis is quite natural for certain problems.
Finally, we would like to acknowledge Professor Hurwicz's disagreement with the claim that the infinitely repeated game-theoretic formulation that we use is general enough to encompass the mechanism design formulation. Furthermore, in his opinion there is no contradiction between the two approaches because they reflect different models of emergence of social institutions: while the infinitely repeated game-theoretic approach tends to model social institutions that emerge endogenously, the mechanism design approach models their emergence as exogenous, or as a sequence of games played by different groups of players.
Notation and Definitions
A noncooperative stochastic game G is defined by
where: (1) Ω, N and, for all i ∈ N, A i are finite sets; (2) for all ω ∈ Ω, and
It is convenient to define G ω = N, {A i } i∈N , {v i ω } i∈N for all ω ∈ Ω,; that is, G ω is to be interpreted as a noncooperative normal form game. Then, the interpretation of G is as follows: there are denumerably many stages, in which some element of {G ω } ω∈Ω will be played. The probability that G ω , ω ∈ Ω, is played in the first stage equals p ω ; the probability that G j , j ∈ Ω, is played in stage k + 1, given that the stage games and the actions played from stage 1 up to stage k were (G j 1 , . ..,
We will typically use g(a|ω, j) for g(ω, j)(a).
Finally we need to specify the strategies players can use and also a way to evaluate payoffs in the supergame of G.
The notation e stands for the unique 0-stage history -it is a 0-length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set of all histories is defined by H = ∞ n=0 H n . The notationh k denotes (h k , ω k+1 ), with h k ∈ H k and ω k ∈ Ω; the space of allh k is denoted byH k . It is assumed that at stage k each player knowsh k , i.e., each player knows the actions that were played in all previous stages, the states of nature of all previous stages and that of the current stage. As for strategies, in each stage k, every player i ∈ N chooses a function σ i k : H k−1 → A i . The set of player i's strategies is denoted by Σ i , and Σ = i∈N Σ i is the joint strategy space. Finally, a strategy vector is σ = {σ
The payoff in the stochastic game G is, for δ ∈ (0, 1), the expected discounted sum of stage game payoffs: ). We also make the convention that e · h = h · e = h for every h ∈ H. Similarly, for everyh ∈ H, we let (h) = (h) denote the length ofh. For two positive length historiesh andh inH, with ω (h)+1 = ω 1 we define the concatenation ofh andh , in that order, to be the history (h ·h ) of length (h) + (h ):
, ω (h +1) ).
Given an individual strategy σ i ∈ Σ i and a historyh ∈H we denote the individual strategy induced by σ i ath by σ i |h. This strategy is defined pointwise onH: (σ i |h)(h ) = σ i (h ·h ), for everyh ∈H. We will use (σ|h) to denote (σ 1 |h, . . . , σ n |h) for every σ ∈ Σ andh ∈H. We let Σ i (σ i ) = {σ i |h : h ∈H} and Σ(σ) = {σ|h :h ∈H}.
A strategy vector σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium of
In many circumstances, we are interested in the physical outcomes that are induced by the choices of the players. Hence, we assume that there is a set Z, referred to as the outcome space, and a function P : A → Z, which describes how laws of physics transform actions into outcomes. , where ω t ∈ Ω, for all t ∈ N. We define, for δ ∈ (0, 1),
With a slight abuse of notation, we write
where,
Outcome Functions
At this point, we can establish some connections between our framework and the one defined in Hurwicz (1994) . An outcome function is a function
it describes what will happen as a consequence of players' choices of strategies for each possible realization of the uncertainty.
Given an outcome function M, we say that a strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium given M if for all i ∈ N , and all
As it is clear from the definition, all we need to describe is the consequences of unilateral deviations. Thus, we define, for any given strategy σ the function
and furthermore,
Remark 1 A strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium given M if and only if, for all i ∈ N , and all
. That is, the knowledge of M i σ for all σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ N , which we call player i's partial outcome function induced by σ, is all we need to discuss Nash equilibria. Similar considerations apply for subgame perfection.
Returning to the framework of the previous section, we recall that a strategy σ determines, for each realization of the uncertainty, a sequence of actions a
For each i ∈ N , and σ ∈ Σ, we define
The function O i σ , which we call player i's outcome function induced by σ, gives the outcome that player i expects if he uses strategy σ i , the realization of uncertainty is ω ∞ and he believes that everyone else is behaving according to σ.
Our objective is to study equilibrium strategies. We assert that although a player-specific outcome function induced by a given strategy does not correspond to an outcome function, it corresponds to a partial outcome function, which, is enough for equilibrium analysis.
Remark 2 A strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ N , and σ
However, if players' preferences are selfish, that is, if for all i ∈ N and z,z such that z i =z i we have u i (z) = u i (z), we may associate an outcome function with a given strategy σ as follows. For σ ∈ Σ, and i ∈ N , let Ψ 
Since Ψ σ maps the joint strategy space into the outcome space, we may call Ψ σ the outcome function induced by I. It describes what outcome each player is expecting to get, when he believes that the others will follows σ.
Remark 3 Suppose that for all i ∈ N , player i's preferences are selfish. Then, a strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all i ∈ N , and
Finally, we define the notion of an equilibrium social institution. Since we defined a social institution as a family of strategies, let S ⊆ Σ denote a social institution. We say that S is a Nash (subgame perfect) equilibrium social institution if there exists σ ∈ S such that σ is a Nash (subgame perfect) equilibrium.
Here, it may help to recall an example we used in the introduction. Consider a legal code in a given society, which classifies certain actions of certain people as 'illegal,' and prescribes a certain punishment, to be enforced by a different group of people. As before, we associate that legal code with the set of all strategies respecting the above properties, i.e., all the strategies that will trigger the corresponding punishment whenever an illegal action is taken. Thus, if two strategies respect the defining properties of a legal code but differ on the legal actions a given player takes, then we would still say that the legal code prevails in both cases. And if one one of these two strategies is an equilibrium, we still say that the legal code is an equilibrium, in the sense that it is plausible (in an equilibrium sense) that such a legal code endures.
Examples

A First Example
The following economic example illustrates our formulation.
3
There are three people in an island, two of whom are farmers and the other one is a guardian. One farmer lives in the North part of the island, while the other farmer lives in the South part. If the weather is good (for farming) in the South (resp. North,) then the Southern (resp. Northern) farmer can produce three loaves of bread. However, the meteorological conditions in this island are such that whenever the weather is good in the South part, the weather is bad in the North part, and vice versa. Finally, the guardian cannot produce any good at all, but he is strong enough to force each one of the others to do what he wants them to do. However, he is very "modest", in the sense that he will be happy provided that he can eat in every period.
set for player i = 1, 2 is
Also, c j t is player j's consumption and also the gift from player i to player j, j = i in period t.
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Regarding player 3, the guardian, he can kill player 1, or player 2, or he can force any allocation in A i (t) , with i(t) = 1 if t is odd and i(t) = 2 if t is even. Also, he can choose not to do anything. His action set is then
then the resulting allocation is the one proposed by the productive farmer. Finally, the third condition says that if the productive farmer was killed in the past, then there is no output.
In this economy there are potential gains from a social institution that would promote gifts between the farmers, to avoid the uneven consumption path that both farmers would experience under autarky. Given our assumption on the discount factor, the gains due to consumption smoothing provided by such social institution are high enough to pay the guardian to enforce the institution.
In what follows, we will present several examples of social institutions that result z t = (1, 1, 1) in all periods. Since not all will be equilibrium social institutions, we will be able to conclude, by studying the incentives of all the members of this society, that some institutions are implementable while some other are not. Hence, the way an outcome is implemented also matters.
One possible social institution, denotedσ, can be described as follows: if the outcome in the past has always equal to (1, 1, 1), then both farmers propose (1, 1, 1) and the guardian does not do anything (i.e., he chooses na.) If player 1 has provoked a deviation from the outcome (1, 1, 1), then the guardian kills him (even if he is already dead) and player 2 proposes (0, 2, 1) (player 1's choice is irrelevant, and therefore omitted.) A similar definition holds for histories in which player 2 has provoked a deviation from the outcome (1, 1, 1). Finally, player 3's deviations go unpunished, as well as multi-player deviations.
However, this strategy is not a Nash equilibrium. This follows because the guardian has an incentive not to kill a deviant farmer: if he doesn't kill he will receive one loaf of bread in every period, and so an utility of 1; if he kills he will receive one loaf of bread every other period, and so an utility of 1−δ 1−δ 2 0.5. Suppose we define another strategy σ * simple changing the action taken by the guarding after a deviation by any farmer to (1, 1, 1). That is, after a deviation from any farmer, the guardian forces the productive farmer to provide one bread to everyone. In this case, it is easy to verify that σ * is a Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibrium.
We would like to use this simple example to make two points: the first is that the function P describes only aspects of physical nature, while the strategies (σ or σ * ) describe the behavioral aspects of (a particular instance of) the society.
Before addressing the second point, note that inσ player 1 receives the . In this case, we would conclude that the restriction ofσ is an equilibrium. However, when we add the guardian as a player, we see that he has an incentive not to carry the enforcement implicit inσ. Hence, we can conclude that the restriction ofσ is not genuinely implementable.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that by making all actors explicit players in the game, we can check whether a social institution is genuinely implementable by studying whether it is an equilibrium of the enlarged game.
A Second Example
Here we present another example of the framework we have in mind. As before, the set of player is denoted by N , and A i is the set of player i's actions, for all i ∈ N . Let A = × i∈N A i . In this example we assume that there is no uncertainty, and that the interaction between the player takes place only in one period.
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Let Z be the outcome space, and P : A → Z be the physical outcome function; the function P describes only physical aspects.
Let us assume that we can partition the set of player into the set I of private agents, and the set I c = N \I of public agents. The latest set includes, for example, congressmen, policemen, bureaucrats, etc. We will interpret different actions by the public agents to correspond to different policies or different laws; in the context of this example we use 'rules' synonymously with 'actions by the public agents.' Corresponding to the above partition of players, we let A I = × i∈I A i , and A −I = × i∈I c A i .
A vector of actions for the public agents is a −I ∈ A −I . For each a −I , we define a function O a −I : A I → Z by O a −I (a I ) = P (a I , a −I ).
The function O a −I is a partial outcome function, mapping the actions that private agents take into consequences -we refer to it as the private agents' partial outcome function.
The private agents' partial outcome function implicitly describes rules that private agents face, and which will influence their behavior. Given our interpretation that the function P describes only physical aspects, then the behavior aspects of the rules will have to be determined by the vector a −I . Hence, we can describe any rule in this economy either by a strategy for the public agents, or by the private agents' partial outcome function that it induces. Alternatively, we may describe a rule by a family of strategies R a −I = {ã ∈ A :ã −I = a −I }.
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One advantage of this formulation is that it allows us to study the incentives of the agents that formulate, and execute, the rules -in particular, we can ask whether the agents that are responsible for the enforcement actually have an incentive to enforce the rule. Also, we can ask whether a given rule will be approved in the congress, etc.
